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The Constitutional Validity of Confining
Disruptive Delinquents in
Penal Institutions
Maynard E. Pirsig*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections recently discussed the need for a new security institution for State Training
School boys who need tighter control. He observed:
What keeps this nifty idea from sailing along (other than the
high price tag on the proposed security facility, of course) is the
spectre of the more than 700 vacant beds in the two adult institutions for men. It's a factor that just won't go away, even
though strong argument is easy to come by about how the adnmustrative transfer of juveniles, no matter how uncontrollable
they may be, to a penal institution is legally taboo. As long as
some states are permitting such transfers, the temptation is
strong here to avoid building a new security institution 1by just
transferring our difficult boys to the Reformatory instead.
The Commissioner was addressing himself to male juveniles
committed to the Department of Corrections by juvenile courts
upon an adjudication of delinquency In Minnesota the institutions to which these youths may be confined are limited to the
State Training School for Boys at Red Wing, the Youth Vocational Camp at Rochester, the Home School at Sauk Centre (for
younger boys) and some other camps established for this purpose. All are open institutions orgamzed either on a cottage
plan or as camps. None have walls or fences or are otherwise
designed for effective security They are, of course, all intended
as treatment institutions to unplement the purposes of juvenile
court laws.
Because juvenile proceedings are considered noncriminal
and confinement is considered treatment oriented, juvenile court
procedures need not include all crinmal protections. The proceedings may commence by petition and summons rather than
by indictment or information, and the hearings are informal,
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. 3 CoRREcTIoNs COMNa (Nov. 29, 1968).

During the 1969 Min-

nesota legislative session, bills were introduced in both houses authorizing transfers of youths from the State Training School for Boys at
Red Wing to the State Reformatory at St. Cloud, Minnesota, and had
the support of the governor's office. The Senate bill received considerable support in committee, but the bill in the House made little headway. Neither bill reached the floor of its respective house.
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confidential and do not involve a jury. 2 Until recently at least,
proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence was sufficient.8
In re Gault 4 does not compel the elimination of all differences between the two procedures. It held that a juvenile
charged with delinquency and facing the possibility of confinement is entitled to notice of the charges, the right to present his
own evidence and confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
the right to be represented by counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination. It may be assumed also that the Miranda
rules 5 and the restrictions on illegal searches and seizures 6 will
be applied. There is nothing, however, that indicates that a
juvenile court proceeding must be treated in all other respects
as a criminal trial. The limitations imposed by Gault are those
which are essential to a fair determination of the facts and to
assurance against arbitrary state action, and hence come within
the general concept of due process as applied to the special procedures of the juvenile court. If these differences between
juvenile and criminal proceedings are to be upheld, the primary purpose of juvenile court proceedings must remain noncriminal. Accordingly the institutions to which juvenile delinquents are committed by juvenile courts must remain treatment
oriented. Some juveniles, however, do not always respond to
such treatment. They violate rules and regulations and disrupt
the program to the detriment of other juveniles. They escape
from the institution and commit depredations upon the community. An open institution is not the place for them. There
is a genuine need for separate facilities, specially designed for
these difficult juveniles and provided with measures of security
not needed or desirable for the remainder of those committed
by juvenile courts.
2. People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956); In re
Deadler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924); Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151
Minn. 467, 187 N.W. 226 (1922).

There are, of course, other differences between criminal and juvenile procedures, such as the absence of bail and of preliminary hearings and the privacy of juvenile court hearings. It is not the purpose
here to develop these differences.
3. See W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299
N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969).

Contra, In re Agler, -

Ohio -

, 249 N.E.2d

801 (1969) (clear and convincing proof required); In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d
535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967), holding proof beyond a reasonable doubt was
required by the implications of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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II. THE PENAL INSTITUTION APPROACH
This is not a new problem. It is reflected in state legislation
since separate institutions for juvenile delinquents were first
provided. In 1861, New York permitted the managers of juvenile institutions to obtain a court order committing a child temporarily to a local "county penitentiary"
[w]henever it shall appear to the managers... that any of the

delinquents therein confined shall have been guilty of attempt-

ing wilfully to set fire to any building belonging to the institution, or any combustible matter for the purpose of setting fire
to any such building, or that any delinquent shall have been
guilty of openly resisting the lawful authority of the officers of
the institution, or of attempting, by threats or otherwise, to excite others to do so, or shall, by gross or habitual misconduct,
exert a dangerous and pernicious influence over the other delinquents .... 7

If the juvenile has committed a felony, nearly all juvenile
court legislation permits juvenile court transfer to the criminal
court for criminal prosecution. If the transfer procedure meets

the requirements of Kent v. United States" and the juvenile is
subsequently convicted of a felony, the judge may commit him
to any penal institution authorized by law for a criminal of-

fense.0
This procedure, however, has not succeeded in eliminating
the problem. It is difficult for a juvenile court judge to identify
with any assurance those juveniles who cannot be treated in an
open institution. Neither statutes, juvenile judges nor appellate
courts have developed any consistent or helpful criteria to determine which youths should or should not be transferred for crim-

7. N.Y. LAws, 1861, ch. 306 § 1. See also MAss. AcTs Am RESOLVES, 1847, ch. 165 § 6, stating that "if he shall be found incorrigible,
or his continuance in the school shall be deemed prejudicial to the
management and discipline thereof," transfer is permitted "to the jail,
house of correction, or state prison." In the cases to which these statutes
applied, the juvenile had been convicted of a criminal offense.
8. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). A hearing must be held and counsel must
be given the right to examine and refute whatever information is given
to the judge and the judge must state his reasons for the transfer. Although a federal statute was under consideration, it was construed in the
light of constitutional requirements.
[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of
such tremendous consequences without ceremony-without
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons.
Id. at 554.
9. State laws commonly provide for his commitment to a state
reformatory if he is under a given age, usually 30 years, and has not
previously been convicted of a felony. See, e.g., Orno Rmv. CODE ANw.
§ 5143.03 (Page 1968).
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inal prosecution."0 It may be assumed also that the administrative authorities responsible for the operation of the juvenile institutions have not supplied the judges with any guidelines in
accordance with which a wise selection can be made. Absent
such standards, there is likely a defensible reluctance on the part
of juvenile court judges to commit a youth to a criminal court
for prosecution and possible commitment to a penal institution.
Juvenile institutions find themselves, therefore, with a considerable number of youths who cannot be treated effectively without more secure facilities than are presently provided them and
whose presence undermines the efforts of the institution on behalf of other juveniles committed to it.
A number of states have sought to deal with the problem by
authorizing the administrative authorities to whom the juvenile
court commits the child to transfer the child -to a penal institution. These statutes take two forms. In one, the authority is
general, giving discretion to transfer without specifying any
conditions or standards. An example is the Wisconsin statute
which provides that the state department of public welfare "may
use other facilities and services under its jurisdiction," rather
than the customary receiving homes, foster and group homes
and institutions -designed "for the training and treatment of children."'1 The state reformatory at Green Bay, Wisconsin, is un10. See the guide lines prepared by the juvenile court of the District
of Columbia set out in the Appendix to the opinion in Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1968). For discussions of the haphazard character
of transfers, see Advisory Council of Judges, Transfer of Cases Between
Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 8 CnvE & DELInQ. 3 (1962); Sargent &
Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction,9 CnmvE &DELiNQ. 121 (1963). Compare
State v. Van Buren, 29 N.J. 548, 150 A.2d 649 (1959) with Ex parte
Lewis, 85 Okla. Crim. 322, 188 P.2d 367 (1947).
Concerning the possibility that constitutional problems are raised
by a transfer based on absence of a secure treatment facility, see Haziel
v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1968), per Bazelon, J.:
We do not find it necessary to determine the difficult question whether the statutory promise of ioncriminal treatment in
all but exceptional circumstances may be denied the juvenile
because of the lack of adequate facilities. We well recognize
the undeniable limitations upon the resources available to the
Juvenile Court. On the other hand, we also cannot ignore the
mockery of a benevolent statute unbacked by adequate facilities.
And to the extent that a juvenile with more affluent parents
might avoid waiver because of the availability of privatelyfinanced treatment and rehabilitation, constitutional issues may
lurk in the problem.
11. -Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.52 (Supp. 1969). See Note, Transfer of
Juveniles to Adult Correctional Institutions, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 866. See
also ILL. REv. STAT. ANx. ch. 23, §§ 2601, 2602, 2604, 2626 (Smith-Hurd
1968).
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der the department's jurisdiction and, substantial numbers of
children have been transferred from institutions for delinquent
children to the reformatory. The language of the Wisconsin
statute is so broad that it might encompass neglected and dependent children committed to the care of the department.12
The federal statute is also of this general character.' 3
Sometimes the power of transfer is limited to specifically
described juveniles, reminiscent of the early statutes.' 4 The
Washington statute authorizes the transfer of "incorrigible juvenile delinquents" over the age of 16 years.
Incorrigibility ... [is defined as] conduct by a juvenile committed to the department by the juvenile court- indicating over
the course of a reasonable period of time that the rehabilitative
program of the department can be of no further benefit to such
juvenile, and that he is in need of closer security.15
12. This possible interpretation is strengthened. by the deletion, in
1961, of language which expressly excluded such children:
except that penal institutions may be used only for children"
adjudged delinquent and only until July 1, 1959,- or such earlier
date as medium security facilities for delinquents are in operation.
Wis. LAWS ch. 67, § 1 (1961).
A neglected child may indeed find himself placed in. a penal institution. See Wintjen v. State, 433 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. 1968), a particularly
distressing case. Wintjen was adjudged a neglected child at the age of
nine. At age 13, he "was transferred as in need of discipline to the
custody of the State Training Schools." From there, he was traislerred
administratively to the state reformatory,. where, at age 17, he assaulted
a guard. Charged with the assault, he refused the offer, of counsel, pled
guilty, and was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment.* The sentence was
sustained because the plea was "voluntary" and in any event he was,
under Missouri statutes, a !'prisoner' . not entitled to resort to selfhelp to secure his release."
13. The general authority of the Attorney General.to transfer inmates from one penal institution to another was ,extended in 1941 to
provide: "The authority conferred upon the Attorney General by this
section shall extend to all persons .committed to the National Training
School for Boys." 18 U.S.C. § 4082(e) (1964). Shortly prior to the
enactment of this provision, Huff v. O!'Bryant, -121 F:2d 890' (D.C. Cir.
1941), had held that the .Attorney. General' had not been given this
authority. "This having created a problem, the-Department of Justice
immediately applied to Congress for the enactment of legislation that
would change this rule of law." Clay -v. Reid, 1-73 F. Supp, 667;- 668
(D.D.C. 1959), in which' the history of this provision is, related..
14. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
.
15. WASH. REv. CoDE..§ 13.04.200: (Supp. ,1967).
Judicial -reirew
is permitted on the ground that the transfer is "arbitrary, capricious,
or contrary to law." WAsH. MRv. CoDE §§ 13.04.200,1 13.04.220 (Supp.
1967).
See also CAL. WELF. & I ST'NS CoDE, § 780 (West 1966), permitting
the Youth Authority to- return the youth to the committing court if he
be so incorrigible or so incapable of reformation under--jhe'
discipline of any institution or facility under, the jurisdiction of
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Some states authorize the juvenile court, as one of its powers
of disposition, to commit the child directly to the penal institution.1 6 Statutes so providing leave the commitment to the discretion of the juvenile court without designation of standards
to guide it. They permit the juvenile court to commit a juvenile
to a penal institution if the judge considers the crime to be an
aggravated one, if he wishes to set an example for others or presumably for any other purpose he envisions, whether or not the
child committed would be uncontrollable if sent to the special
institution for delinquents.
These statutes permitting administrative transfer or direct
judicial commitment raise serious constitutional questions, for the
juvenile finds himself in a penal institution as the result of a
noncriminal proceeding intended to provide for his treatment
and rehabilitation. In view of the extensive attention that has
been given to the rights of juveniles in juvenile court proceedings and to defendants in criminal cases, it is surprising that
little scholarly consideration has been given to the constitutional
validity of these transfers and commitments. Very little information is available regarding the extent, function and effect of
these transfers or commitments. 17 Sheridan and Freer 8 found
the Youth Authority as to render his retention detrimental to
the interests of the Youth Authority ... the court is not
permitted to return the youth to the Authority.
But see In re Dargo, 86 Cal. App. 2d 114, 194 P.2d 34 (1948).
16. OnIo REv. CODE ANN. § 21.51.35 (E) (Page 1968), which provides that the court may "[cJommit a male child over sixteen years
of age who has committed an act which if committed by an adult would
be a felony to the Ohio State reformatory;" N.J. STAT., § 2A: 4-37 (Supp.
1968):
The juvenile and domestic relations court on proper cause shown
may ....
Commit the child to a public institution established
for the care, custody, instruction and reform of juvenile offenders
or to any other appropriate institution maintained by the

State.

The phrase "any other appropriate institution maintained by the State"
appears to include the reformatory for men. See In re Smigelski, 30
N.J. 513, 524, 154 A.2d 1 (1959).
17. Only one major discussion, published by the U.S. Children's
Bureau and addressed specifically to the problem has appeared. See
W. SHERmAN & A. FREER, CHILuRw's BuRmu, U.S. DEP'T or HEW, DELINQUENT CHILDREN IN PENAL INsTITUTIONs (1964). See also, Comment,
Transfer of Juveniles to Adult CorrectionalInstitutions, 1966 Wis. L. REV.
866 (discussing the Wisconsin practice); Comment, Facts and Law of Inter-InstitutionalTransfer of Juveniles, 20 ATz. L. REV. 93 (1968) (discussing the Maine practice); Case Note, 16 DPaix L. REv. 101 (1967) (discussing Wilson v. Coughlin, 259 Iowa, 1163, 147 N.W.2d 175 (1966)). Note the
brief and vapid comment in the TASK FoRcE REPORT: CORRECTIONS,
Appendix A. at 178:
In many States, intermediate institutions receive both juve-
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from questionnaires submitted to the juvenile institutions that
"[a]n average of about 478 children per year were transferred
by State training schools for juvenile delinquents to penal institutions in the period 1959-61." This figure did not reflect the
number of direct commitments by juvenile courts nor, of course,
juvenile institutions not reporting. That the figure is too low is
indicated by the following facts: (1) in 1965 the Reformatory
of Ohio alone released Ill juveniles; 19 and (2) in Wisconsin there
were 169 transfers2 to the State Reformatory by the Department
of Public Welfare.
Even less information is available concerning such matters
as the characteristics of the juveniles committed to reformatories, the basis on which they were selected, 21 the program provided them in reformatories, and the impact of the reformatory
on the child while there and on his subsequent return to the
community. The writer's visits to the reformatories in Ohio,
Iowa and Wisconsin indicated no separate programs for these
children. They were integrated into the general inmate population and subjected to the same control, routine and discipline.
There was no observable evidence of any special concern. 22 Abniles and adults. Thus, the border between the juvenile and
the adult is blurred.

The report "blurred" the subject even more by treating juvenile institutions throughout its discussion as merely an aspect of correctional
institutions in general.
18. Supra note 17, at 6.
19. OHIo LEG. SERV. Com. OHIo's JuEiE CoRREcTION Sys. STAFF
RESEARcH REP., No. 83, at 62 (1967). It may be assumed that the number

committed to the Reformatory was approximately the same. Their average stay was 19 months.
20. I Wis. LEG. CouNcn. REP. 12 (1967).
21.

Compare OHIo

LEG. SERV. COM., OHIO'S JUVMLE CORRECTION

Sys., STAFF REsEARcH REP., No. 83 at 62-63 (1967):
A review based purely on the most serious offense with

which the offender was charged, shows little difference in offenses for which juveniles are sent to the reformatory by the
juvenile court or the common pleas court ....

[I]t appears

from available information that these youths could as well

have been committed to a medium security facility operated
by the Youth Commission, were it considered desirable to remove the juvenile court's authority to commit juveniles to the
reformatory.
22. Compare 1 Wis. LEG. Couxcm REP. 24 (1967). After expressing concern over the "serious legal problems" presented, the report
continued:
However it was argued that these transfers avoid giving the
juvenile a criminal conviction on his record and provide the
department with the only practicable method of handling those

juveniles who cannot successfully be handled in juvenile
facilities.
It therefore offered a compromise solution, "give the child an administra-
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sent any substantial literature or factual data, it is not surprising that the decisional law is in a state of confusion.
III. THE CASE LAW
A. BACKGROUND
In examining the decisions, some frequently ignored distinctions need to be drawn. First, it is well settled that the legislature may give an administrative agency authority to transfer a
convicted felon from one penal institution to another. The right
to transfer is implicit in the sentence imposed. 23 Furthermore,
the constitutional issues are the same if the original commitment
following criminal conviction was to a treatment institution and
the subsequent transfer is to one penal in character. Thus, in
Sheehan v. Superintendent of Concord Reformatory 4 the court
stated:
As penalty for the crime to which the petitioner pleaded
guilty he might have been sentenced in the first instance to the
Massachusetts Reformatory at Concord. He was in truth sentenced to [a treatment institution]. There was, however, incorporated into that sentence, as an integral part, the condition that
if he proved unmanageable or unfit for the mild treatment of the
industrial school, he might be transferred by the proper executive
officers to the Massachusetts Reformatory. That is the effect
of [the statute]. That provision was as much a part of the
sentence as if it had been extended at length on the record of
the court. It follows that the differences between the industrial school and the reformatory in management or character,
whatever they may be, are of no consequence in this connection. Confinement in each was affixed by the statute as a penalty for the crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty. Both
institutions were within the purview of the sentence actually
imposed.
The determination of the question whether the petitioner
after his sentence was "unmanageable or an improper person"
longer to remain at the industrial school is not necessarily judicial in nature. It stands on the same footing as the decision of
numerous questions touching the discipline of inmates of reformatory or penal institutions. It was administrative in its
essence.2 5

In such cases, the requirements of due process having been satisfied by the trial, the transfer merely involves a change in the
manner in which the sentence is carried out.2 6
tive hearing, set standards for transfer and provide judicial review." The
report is devoid of any other concern for an adequate program for these
children.
23. S. RuBIN, ET AL., THE LAw OF CRnximuAL CoREcToNs 284 (1963).
24. 254 Mass. 342, 150 N.E. 231 (1926).
25. Id. at 346, 150 N.E. at 233. Accord, Harwood v. State, 184 Tenn.
515, 201 S.W.2d 672 (1947).
26. The grant of even wider powers to the Youth Conservation Corn-
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Second, there are many decisions which sustain transfers
and commitments of delinquents to penal institutions without
consideration of their constitutional validity. For example, a
number of federal decisions, frequently cited as sustaining transfers under the federal statute, involve no more than statutory
interpretation and application. 27 In Riley v. Pescor 28 statutory
authorization of the Attorney General to transfer juvenile delinquents from the National Training School for Boys to a penal
institution was upheld. The court merely stated:
Under Section 753f (now U.S. Code, § 4032) as amended, the
Attorney General may transfer prisoners from one institution
to another, at his discretion. Stroud v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 139
F.2d 171.29

The Stroud decision, however, involved not a juvenile delinquent, but a convicted criminal who had been transferred from
one federal penitentiary to another.
The federal statutory provision that proceedings under the
Juvenile Act were permissible only upon consent of the juvenile
has similarly been used as a matter of statutory construction to
sustain transfers. In Suarez v. Wilkinson o the juvenile, acting
pro se, contended that his transfer to a penal institution was invalid, stating:
The proceding [sic] being Civil Nature only and not Criminal,
therefore the committment [sic] that holds Petitioner in the
Northeastern Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, is
[Void].

Being no committment [sic] at all.81

The court replied that the benefit of the Act is accorded the
juvenile only "if he consents to such procedure" but that this
mission in the execution of sentences was sustained in State v. Meyer,
228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W.2d 3 (1949).
These principles are not believed to be affected by Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). After Specht had been convicted of a criminal

offense, proceedings were commenced under a sex offenders act which

authorized an increased sentence following a psychiatric examination
and a finding that the defendant "constitutes a threat of bodily harm
to members of the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill."
Because an adequate hearing was not provided for the existence of the
latter facts, the statute was held to violate the requirements of due
process. Statutes authorizing the transfer of a convict from one institution to another do not entail an increase in the length of sentence and
hence Specht is inapplicable.
27. For a discussion of lower federal court decisions, reported and
unreported, see the opinion of Ketcham, J., in Matter of Eleven Youths
Committed to National Training School, reported in 14 Juv. CT. JDGES
J., No. 4, at 9 (1964).
28. 63 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1945).
29. Id. at 4.

30. 133 F. Supp. 38 (M.D. Pa. 1955).
31. Id. 38-39.
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did not mean that he could dictate determination of the proper
remedy.
The [Juvenile Delinquency] Act was enacted with the realization that persons under the age of eighteen do not have mature
judgment and may not fully realize the nature or consequences
of their acts. The right to benefits of the Act is not absolute.
. .

Custody is an essential feature in those cases where parole

is not feasible and the nature of such custody, in line with the
juvenile's reaction thereto, must necessarily be left to the discretion of those in charge of the problem of rehabilitation. The
power of the Attorney General to designate the place of confinement has not3 been
abrogated in any respect by the Juvenile
2

Delinquency Act.

This was the origin in the federal courts of the consent
theory. By asking to be tried under the federal juvenile delinquency law, the juvenile was deemed to have consented to a
later possible transfer. The theory was adopted by the only
federal court of appeals decision 33 on t;he question, the court add-

ing:
Petitioner alleges that no facilities are provided at Terre Haute
for juveniles. However, the United States Penitentiary there is
equipped with the usual medical, psychiatric and34vocation training facilities for individual treatment of inmates.
The import of these decisions is that because the youth consented
to the proceedings under the Federal Juvenile Delinquncy Act,
he cannot then complain that he is being confined in a penitentiary so long as he is provided "with the usual medical, psychiatric and vocation training facilities" provided for the prison
population generally. In none of these consent cases is there
real examination of the extent to which the consequences of his
consent were explained to the youth or whether he understood
the explanation if one was given. The cases similarly ignore
the question of whether the juvenile had access to the advice of
his parents, another adult or an attorney. They thus stand in
stark contrast to the concern which the United State Supreme
5
Court has shown over juvenile waivers of constitutional rights.3
32. Id. at 39-40.
33. Sonnenberg v. Markley, 289 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1961). See also
Arkadiele v. Markley, 186 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Ind. 1960); Coats v.
Markley, 200 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
Clay v. Reid, 173 F. Supp. 667 (D.D.C. 1959), also sustained a
transfer solely on the ground that the Federal Act so provided. The
court was "aware that the opposite opinion has been expressed," but
thought "that if the legislative history of this statute had been presented
in detail, very likely the opposite conclusion would not have been
reached." The relevance of the legislative history to the constitutional
issues raised by the "opposite opinion" was not discussed.
34. 289 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1961).
35. Compare Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962):
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Since the consent provision in the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act is a peculiar one rarely found in other juvenile
court acts, the federal decisions discussed are of little value in
considering the constitutional validity of statutes which authorize transfers or commitments of juvenile delinquents to penal
institutions without regard to their consent. Turning to the remaining state and federal cases dealing specifically with the
problem, one finds the decisions sharply divided with analysis
of the central issues strikingly inadequate.
B. CASES INVALIDATING COM IiIENTS AND TRASFERS

White v. Reid 3c was the first decision to hold a transfer of a
juvenile delinquent to a penal institution invalid on constitutional grounds. The youth was being confined in the District of
Columbia jail and sought a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his
release. The court held that continued confinement in the jail
was not authorized by the adjudication of delinquency, but
stayed further action to permit the Attorney General to place
him in an appropriate institution.
The argument of the court centered on two points. First,
notwithstanding the greater emphasis placed by modern penal
institutions on rehabilitation and training, their basic purpose is
still "punishment as a deterrent to crime." Unless the institution "is one whose primary concern is the individual's moral and
The prosecution says that the youth and immaturity of the

petitioner and the five-day detention are irrelevant, because the
basic ingredients of the confession came tumbling out as soon
as
was arrested.
But if we
took that
position,
would, with
all he
deference,
be in callous
disregard
of this
boy's itconstitutional
rights.
He and
cannot
be compared ofto the
an adult
in full possession
of
his senses
knowledgeable
consequences
of his admissions. ....
Without some adult protection against this in-

equality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let
alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had. To allow
this conviction to stand would, in effect, be to treat him as if
he had no constitutional rights.
See also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
To the argument that the juvenile had walved the usual safeguards
of criminal procedure with knowledge of the Attorney General's power
of transfer, the court in United States v. Hegstrom, 178 F. Supp. 17, 19
(D. Conn. 1959) replied:
The difficulty with that arguement is that the waiver was
for the purpose of a juvenile proceeding, not criminal in nature.
A later change without opportunity to be heard, reconverting
it into a criminal proceeding, is lacking in due process.
36. 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954). A second opinion following
a transfer to a penal institution was rendered in White v. Reid, 126 F.
Supp. 867, 870 (D.D.C. 1954).
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physical well-being, unless its facilities are intended for and
adapted to guidance, care, education and training rather than
punishment, unless its supervision is that of a guardian, not that
of a prison guard or jailor," commitment without a criminal conviction cannot withstand constitutional attack. Second, "to send
a juvenile to the usual penitentiary where hardened criminals
are kept in close confinement and under special types of strict
discipline, where the juvenile would inevitably come into contact
with them and suffer the same type of treatment as they do
would in effect stamp the case of the juvenile as a criminal
case."3 7 The opinion was thus open to the implication that
if the primary purpose of a penal institution was treatment and
rehabilitation rather than punishment, and if it contained no
hardened criminals, the transfer would be permitted.
The Attorney General promptly transferred the youth to
the Federal Correctional Institution at Ashland, Kentucky, an
institution designed primarily for treatment but including only
those youths convicted of a criminal offense who were amenable
to treatment. This would appear to have met the implications of
the court's opinion. Nevertheless, the transfer was challenged
and the court held it invalid. The issue was considered to be
"whether a juvenile committed under civil or equitable proceedings may be sent to mingle with those convicted of crime." 38
The court found that the purpose of the Federal Youth Correction Act, under which the Ashland facility was designed, was
to
rehabilitate youths regularly convicted of crime who show

promise of becoming useful citizens by providing a new alterna-

tive sentencing and treatment procedure.... The purpose of
the Juvenile Court Act of the District of Columbia, on the other
hand, is the promotion of the child's welfare and the state's best
interests by the strengthening of family ties where possible,
and, when it is necessary to remove the child from custody of
his parents for his welfare or the safety or protection of the
public, securing for him custody, care and protection as nearly
as possible equivalent to that which should have been given
him by his parents.... It extends not only to those who have
violated the law, but also 3includes
the truant, the abandoned,
the homeless, the neglected. 9

The court contrasted the procedures under the Juvenile
Court Act of the District of Columbia with those under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act,40 listing six differences including
37. 125 F. Supp. at 650.

38. White v. Reid, 126 F. Supp. 867, 8170 (D.D.C. 1954).
39. Id.

40. The court left open the question whether a transfer of a youth
committed under this Act was permissible.
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the consent provision of the latter.41 The court appeared to be
impressed that the procedure under the Federal Act retained
42
more of the characteristics of a criminal trial.
How these several considerations bore on the constitutionality of the transfer to the Ashland facility was not explained.
The court simply concluded
that both Constitution and statute forbid the transfer of a youth
committed under the Juvenile Court Act to any institution designed for the custody of persons convicted of crime, including
the Federal Correctional Institution at Ashland, 43Kentucky, and
the commingling of such juveniles with criminals.
The issue was next presented in State v. Adams 44 where a
youth initially committed to the Industrial School for Boys was
later returned to the juvenile court as incorrigible and sentenced
by that court to the state penitentiary for a period of years without a criminal trial.4 5 The court referred to the state constitutional provision that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for
treason, felony or other crime, not cognizable by a justice, unless
on presentment or indictment of a grand jury,"46 and held that
due process forbids such confinement of a youth in the state penitentiary unless the sentence was upon conviction under a valid
indictment of a grand jury for a felony.47 The invalidity was
particularly apparent since the statute and the action taken by
the juvenile court were in terms characteristic of a sentence
41. The court cites Holtzoff, The Purposes and Constitutionality

of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 84 CONG. REc. app., at 3289-91

(1939), an address before a federal judicial conference. Both the
address and White v. Reid preceded the U.S. Supreme Court decisions
cited in note 35 supra. 126 F. Supp. at 871.
42. Speaking of the Juvenile Court Act for the District of Columbia, the court observed:
In contrast,.. . since the proceedings are not criminal in nature,
and the court being without jurisdiction to try the juvenile
as an accused criminal, the strict requirements of criminal
trials under the Constitution are neither required nor observed.
126 F. Supp. at 871.
43. Id.
44. 143 W. Va. 325, 102 S.E.2d 145 (1958).
45. The sentence was pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 28-1-7 (1966),
which reads:
In any case where a youth is committed to the industrial school
for an offense punishable by confinement in the penitentiary,
and it is found by the State commissioner of public institutions
...
his presence is a detriment ... to the general good of the
school, he may be returned to the court by which he was committed to the school, and such court shall thereupon pass such
sentence upon him as to confinement in the penitentiary as
may be proper in the premises, or as it might have passed
had it not committed him to the industrial school.
46. W. VA. CONST., art. III, § 4.
47. 143 W. Va. 325, 329, 102 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1958).
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upon a conviction of a crime-the word "sentence" was used and
the commitment was to a "penitentiary" for a term of years.
A more careful analysis of the issues posed was made in
United States ex tel. Stinnett v. Hegstrom48 where several juveniles sought release from a penal institution to which they had
been transferred from a juvenile facility. Some had been committed to the facility under the District of Columbia Juvenile
Court Act and others under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act. Among its findings of facts, the court stated that the penal
institution had no provision for segregation of juveniles. 49 Observing that there had been no crimial trial either for the original misconduct which led to the juvenile court commitment or
the later misconduct resulting in transfer,50 the court deemed
the transfer a punishment inflicted "without the constitutionally
guaranteed trial for the offense for which incarcerated," and
added, "[t] hey must be confined only with other juveniles until
and unless charged with and convicted of crime."', The court
thereupon concluded that the transfers were invalid on the constitutional ground of denial of due process.
More recently, in 1966 two state supreme courts have also
condemned these transfers or commitments. In In re Rich,5 2 a
14 year old juvenile had been committed to a boys' school following a charge that he "had contributed to the delinquency of a
14 year old school friend by encouraging and causing the friend
to commit petty larceny by stealing a sum of money from that
friend's own parents.153 Three years later by order of the governor he was transferred to the Vermont House of Correction, a
penal institution.5 4 The Vermont Supreme Court ordered his return to the boys' school, stating that the validity of the juvenile
court system depends upon its adherence to its protective rather
than its penal aspect and that to permit confinement in a penal
institution would convert the proceedings from juvenile to criminal and require the observance of constitutional criminal safe48. 178 F. Supp. 17 (D. Conn. 1959).
49. Id. at 18.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 21. White and Hegstrom were relied upon in Kautter v.
Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960), to reach a statutory construction
which prevented detention of a juvenile delinquent in the District of
Columbia jail upon revocation of parole from the National Training
School for Boys.
52. 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966).
53. Id. at 374, 216 A.2d at 267.
54. 28 VT. STAT. Azim § 415 (1959) authorizes the transfer of a
juvenile "who does not obey the regulations of such school and is not of
good deportment."
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guards. 5 The court referred to the "administrative and disciplinary problems" which its holding imposed, but stated, "[i]t is
fundamental, however, that solutions to these problems must
meet constitutional standards."' 56
The other 1966 decision, one of the latest to hold these trans5
fers and commitments unconstitutional, is State v. Owens. 7

The factual situation in the case was unique. The district court
in a mandamus proceeding had ordered the juvenile court judge
to assume jurisdiction of a case in which the child was charged
with "glue sniffing." The juvenile judge had stated that since the
child had previously been adjudicated a wayward or miscreant
child under an existing statute,58 he would be subjected to a
possible sentence in the Kansas Industrial Reformatory at
Hutchinson, Kansas. The acts for which the child was charged
in this case were neither a misdemeanor nor a felony under state
law and therefore the juvenile judge deemed the statute unconstitutional.
The district court thought otherwise, basing its conclusion
on the statute creating the Reformatory-its stated purpose was
to "reform" the persons committed to it.59 The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed. Notwithstanding the language of the
statute and of prior Kansas cases characterizing the reformatory
as a school rather than a prison, the court held the Reformatory
to be a penal institution. It noted that the institution was under
the supervision of the state director of penal institutions while
the boys' industrial school was under the state department of
social welfare. 60 It reviewed the testimony that the reformatory
55. 125 Vt. 373, 377; 216 A.2d 266, 270 (1966).
56. Id. at 378, 216 A.2d at 271.
57. 197 Kan. 212, 416 P.2d 259 (1966).

58. The statute refers to a "miscreant child" as one who has been
adjudged a "wayward child" three or more times. A "wayward child"
includes one "whose behavior is injurious to his welfare."
59. KAN. STAT. § 76-2320 (1964) provides:

The discipline to be observed in said reformatory shall be
reformatory, and it shall be the duty of said director to maintain such control over all persons committed to his care as
shall prevent them from committing crime and best secure
their self-support and accomplish their reformation; and to this
end said director shall adopt such means of reformation as consistent with the improvement of the inmates as he deems expedient.
This statute is typical of those of many states establishing reformatories.
E.g., OHro REv. CODE § 5143.02 (1954); Mo. STAT. AxN. § 216.090 (1959);
N.Y. CoRREc. LAW § 277 (McKinney 1968); Vxnzm. STAT. § 243.78 (1967).
60. This would appear to be a factor of limited significance. Modem departments of correction commonly include both penal institutions
and institutions for delinquent children without affecting their separate
functions.
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was a maximum security facility with guards, iron bars and cell
blocks, unlike the boys industrial school, which had a smaller
population, gave more individual attention to its inmates and
had a more extensive professional staff. The court concluded:
We hold confinement in a penal institution will convert the proceedings from juvenile to criminal and require the observance
of constitutional safeguards. The noncriminal aspect is the
legal backbone of the constitutionality of all American juvenile
court legislation. If after a juvenile proceeding, the juvenile
can be committed to a place of penal servitude, the entire claim
of parens patriae becomes a hyprocrit-cal mockery. Such action
confines a person in a 61penal institution without having been
found guilty of a crime.
The analysis in these cases leaves much to be desired. It is
inadequate to state summarily that confinement in a penal institution is punishment which cannot be inflicted without a criminal conviction. This is the very issue that requires examination. If a reformatory or other penal institution does in fact
provide a program of rehabilitation best suited to reform the incorrigible and dangerous juvenile, why not use it? Why must
it be considered punishment? What constitutional principle is
violated by utilizing an effective program located in a penal institution? Indeed, an eminent penologist has stated that exposure to the advice and assistance of those criminal inmates who
are stable and mature in the setting of a penal institution may
be very conducive to effective rehabilitation of juveniles. 62 The
failure to provide satisfactory answers to such questions may
be a reason why some courts have chosen to follow a different
course.
C.

CASES SUSTAINING TRANSFERS AND CownSr

s

A frequently expressed rationale for sustaining transfers
and commitments of juveniles to penal institutions is that the
juvenile court proceeding is noncriminal and therefore commitment to an institution pursuant to such proceedings is not
punishment. Thus in Leonard, Superintendent v. Licker,6 3 the
court concluded:
61. 197 Kan. 212, 223, 416 P.2d 259, 269 (1966).
62. D. GLASER & F. COHEN, Ts EFFECTVZNESS OF Tm PRISON PAROLE
SYSTEm 157-59 (1964). Compare Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 575 (1957).
Should there be a proper classification of convicted personnel
and a civilized penal philosophy directing an institution, the
mingling of some convicted young people with delinquents will
not strike us as unfair.
See also F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORRECTIONS 98-100 (Joint
Comm. on Correctional Manpower and Training 1969).
63. 3 Ohio App. 377 (1914).
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The Ohio state reformatory is a prison for persons who are
convicted of felonies and committed thereto upon a sentence of
the court following such conviction; but for delinquent children
who may be committed thereto after having committed an act
constituting a felony it is only a school or place of reformation.
It is what its name imports, a reformatory.64
The juvenile court proceedings were regarded as noncriminal in
character and hence commitment to the reformatory was likewise noncriminal. 9 5
The theme that juvenile court proceedings are noncriminal
in character and hence the child cannot object to his confinement
in a reformatory was repeated by the Ohio Supreme Court in
In re Darnell.06 The court stated, "[h] e was not convicted. Nor
was he sentenced but was committed to the reformatory. '6 7 The
only authority cited was two cases in which commitment to a
treatment facility rather than a penal institution was sustained. 8 The difference between a boys' institution and a reformatory was ignored or overlooked. Cope v. Campbell6 9
reached the same conclusion on substantially the same reasoning.
It held that because juvenile court proceedings are civil rather
than criminal, the appellant was not entitled to a jury trial, appointed counsel, or advice of his constitutional rights, and that
his record of misconduct made him "a proper subject of commit' 70
ment to the Ohio State Reformatory.
64. Id. at 381.
65. The case is criticized in Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CoRuEL L.Q. 387, 388 (1961). See also S. RuBIN, Cani
AND JUVENILE DELINQUENcY 70 (1958). The case has been ignored in
subsequent cases in Ohio and elsewhere.
Also generally ignored is the reported decision of the trial court in
In re Robertson, 5 Terry 28, 54 A.2d 848 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1947). The
court sustained its prior approval of a transfer from the Ferris School for
Boys to the New Castle County Workhouse, an institution for criminals.
A statute authorized the transfer if the "minor is destructive to the program of the School, and is hindering and delaying the rehabilitation of
other minors in said School." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 5109 (1953).
The only question discussed was whether transfers from one penal
institution to another are permissible. No recognition was given to the
fact that the Farris School was not a penal institution.
66. 173 Ohio St. 335, 182 N.E.2d 321 (1962).
67. Id. at 336, 182 N.E.2d at 322.
08. Prescott v. State of Ohio, 19 Ohio St. 184 (1869); Wissenburg
v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1929).
69. 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964).
70. Id. at 477, 196 N.E.2d at 458. This case and foregoing Ohio
decisions are, however, of doubtful validity because of Gault. Indeed the
recent case of State v. Fisher, 17 Ohio App. 2d 183, 245 N.E.2d 358 (1969)
disregarded them and relying on Gault held the statute permitting
commitment to the State Reformatory unconstitutional. But see contra,
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A more careful discussion sustaining the validity of a transfer or commitment to a penal institution occurs in Wilson v.
Coughlin,71 in which the juvenile sought release by writ of habeas corpus from the Iowa Reformatory after he had been administratively transferred from the state's training school for
boys. 72 Release was denied, the court stating:
Petitioner was not charged or convicted of a crime, and his
confinement in a state institution under the board of control is
education, discipline, and rehabilitation. Secfor the purpose of
tion 242.2 Code.[ 73] Petitioner's detention is custodial, not penal
in nature, but the security provisions necessary for his detention
are, in the first instance, strictly up to the boy. If he cannot
be detained at the school, the board is given permission to transfer him to a more secure facility. By doing so, he is not being
punished and is not treated as a prisoner. He has no term to
serve, has no record placed against him, and must be classified
as a juvenile in parental custody. He is not permitted association with older prisoners. Section 246.36.[741 His commitment
In re Baker, 18 Ohio App. 2d 276, 248 N.E.2d 620 (1969) in which Gault
is not mentioned.
See also In re Agler,

-

Ohio -

, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969) which

overrules Cope v. Campbell on the issues of appointed counsel and
advising of constitutional rights.
71. 259 Iowa 1163, 147 N.W.2d 175 (1966).
72. IowA CODFn ANN. § 218.91 (1969) provides for the transfer "for
custodial care whenever it is determined that such action will be conducive to the welfare of the other inmates of the school." A court order
approving the transfer must first be obtained. As worded, the statute
is concerned only with "custodial care" of the child transferred and the
"welfare of the other inmates." It says nothing about the treatment of
the child. The point is not discussed in the decision.
73. This section provides that the superintendent of the training
school for boys
shall discipline, govern, instruct, employ, and use his best
endeavors to reform the pupils in his care, so that, while preserving their health, he may promote, as far as possible, moral,
religious, and industrious habits, and regular, thorough, and
progressive improvement in their studies, trade, and employment.
There is no corresponding provision with respect to the reformatory.
IowA CODE ANN. § 218.91 (1969), authorizing transfers, provides that the
child shall thereafter "be subject to all the provisions of law and regulations of the institution to which he is transferred."
74. This section provides, "The wardens shall, so far as practicable,
prevent prisioners under eighteen years of age from associating with
other prisoners."
Compare the observation of the dissenting judge:
We should not presume from such an equivocal section that
the warden at Anamosa has been provided with the facilities
and budget to handle juvenile inmates separately. Though the
record is silent on the matter, oral argument by the attorneys
indicated the contrary.
259 Iowa at 1179, 147 N.W.2d at 185.
During the writer's visit to the Iowa Reformatory in early 1967, he
found no such separation. In fact he was informed it had few if any
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or detention is not that of a convict.Th
In short, because the child has not been convicted, and receives no criminal record but is "in parental custody" of the
state, he is not being punished though he is confined in the same
institution in which adults are being punished. If he doesn't like
76
this parental attention, he need only change his ways.
The two latest cases upholding these transfers or commitments come from Maine. In Shone v. State,77 the juvenile was
committed by a juvenile court to the Boys Training Center of the
state. Thirteen days later he was administratively transferred
to the state Reformatory for Men.7 8 As stated by the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, the boy attacked the transfer because it
was "without notice and hearing and without judicial approval"
and specifically "being in violation of the due process clauses of
both constitutions and of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution."
These objections were held without validity. After referring
to cases sustaining administrative transfer of a person convicted
of a crime,7 9 the court recognized that
the instant transfer from the Boys Training Center to the Reformatory for Men is not on the same level as transfers from the
Reformatory to the State Prison. The Center in the eyes of the
Legislature was not meant to be considered as a penal institution. The State is directed to establish and maintain centers to
rehabilitate boys between the ages of 11 and 17 committed
thereto as juvenile offenders .... See, in contrast thereto, 34
M. R. S. A. § 1501, wherein the Reformatory is defined as a correctional institution and the State prison as a penal institution.
However, the court did not pursue the consequences of that contrast. Instead, it quoted from a prior Maine case, 0 which extolled the "benevolent purposes" of the juvenile court law the
such transfers. The information given him at the boys training school
did not fully bear this out.
75. 259 Iowa at 1169, 147 N.W.2d at 179.
76. Compare the dissenting opinion, id. at 1178, 147 N.W.2d at 184:
The observation that how the boy is treated is completely up
That he is
to the boy begs the question here presented ....
not capable of meeting such a challenge is the very reason for
his special treatment, for the training-not-penalty theory of the
entire system.
77. 237 A.2d 412 (Me. 1968).
78. 15 MaE. REv. STAT. § 2717 (1965) authorizes such transfer of a
boy
whose presence therein may be seriously detrimental to the
well-being of the center, or who wilfully and persistently refuses to obey the rules and regulations of said center.
79. See text accompanying notes 24 & 26 supra.
80. Wade v. Warden of State Prison, 145 Me. 120, 73 A.2d 128 (1950).
The case sustained the validity of a transfer by a juvenile court to the
criminal court for criminal prosecution.
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aim of which is "to protect, by exercising a parental control,
without the scar of the so-called criminal record."8'
These "benevolent purposes" were not thought to invalidate
the transfer statute. The court viewed the statute as recognizing
that at times in dealing with disruptive juvenile delinquents
"sterner treatment and better security . . must replace the benevolent attitude initially displayed." The transfer was authorized "not so much as a measure of punishment to the individual youth, but rather as a device for the protection of the
juvenile center itself in the interest and general welfare of all
those who submit willingly and obediently to its humanitarian
curriculum.

8 2

The court was well aware of the impact of the transfer on
the child:
The petitioner decries his loss of certain substantial privileges
to support his claim of deprivation of constitutional rights.
True, at the Center a juvenile is not required to wear institutional garb; he is not under constant surveillance of guards; he
is not confined within fenced or walled areas; he may leave the
grounds to spend weekends at private homes; he may attend a
public high school in the vicinity or be allowed to take courses
at the University of Maine; he may travel throughout the state
as part of the Center's athletic program or choir group. All
these liberties vanish with his transfer to the Reformatory. But
they are withdrawn for all juveniles transferred because of incorrigibility and thus the procedure is not 83offensive to the constitutional requirement of equal protection.
The court concluded the transfer statute "merely sets up an
administrative procedure to which the rules of constitutional due
process are not applicable" 84-but a conclusion reached evidently
not without misgivings. The court warned that the transfer was
dependent upon the juvenile court proceeding having met the
requirements of Gault. The court emphasized, however, that the
proceedings "remain civil in character, and the constitutional requirement of a jury trial . . . does not apply to them. '8 5 The
misgivings were carried no further. The central constitutional
issue of whether a child may be transferred to a penal institution
without criminal conviction was not examined. It was sufficient
for the court that these children could not be dealt with in an
81. Shone v. State, 237 A.2d 412, 415 (Me. 1968).
82. Id. at 415.
83. Id. at 416. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), discussed
at text accompanying note 150 infra, was not mentioned, nor was there
any other discussion of the question of equal protection.
84. 237 A.2d 412, 416 (Me. 1968).
85. Id. at 417.
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existing boys' institution. From that it concluded that a penal
institution was a proper alternative. 88
Young Shone then sought relief from the federal district
court of Maine, and met the same fate.8 7 The case is the only
federal decision dealing with the validity of a state transfer or
commitment of a juvenile delinquent to a penal institution. It
is unclear from the court's opinion what it considered the constitutional issue to be. It stated that
the sole ground asserted by petitioner ... is that he was

denied due process of law and the equal protection of the laws
.... He contends that 15 M. R. S. A. § 2717, insofar as it permits the transfer of an inmate of the Boys Training Center to
the Men's Correctional Center without at least some procedural
safeguards such as a judicial hearing, the right to counsel, and
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is unconstitutional and void.88
If this means that only the transfer procedure was being attacked
for lack of procedural safeguards, the issue was indeed a narrow
one and fairly settled by current state decisions. Without fur-

ther analysis the court replied that "the great weight of state
and lower federal authority" upholds such administrative interinstitutional transfers. For this the court cited four relevant decisions sustaining these transfers, 9 five lower federal court
cases, without noting that they were based on the consent theory,90 and seven state cases involving transfers of persons convicted of criminal offenses, and hence inapplicable. 91
With respect to decisions contrary to its views the court referred only to United States ex rel. Stinnett v. Hegstrom,9 2 and
White v. Reid.93 In a footnote, it questioned the present merit of
these cases in view of Gault,94 which it construed as holding

"that a juvenile may not be committed for a juvenile offense to
any type of institution without the traditional criminal constitu86. The court relied on Sheehan v. Superintendent of Concord
Reformatory, 254 Mass. 342, 150 N.E. 231 (1926) in which there had
been a conviction and which, therefore, is inapplicable to the present
issue. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
87. Shone v. Maine, 286 F. Supp. 511 (S.D. Me. 1968).
88. Id. at 512.
89. The Ohio decisions were not included, probably because they
were concerned with direct juvenile court commitments to the penal institutions rather than with transfers.
90. See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
91. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
92. 178 F. Supp. 17 (D.Conn. 1959). See text accompanying notes
48-50 supra.
93. 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954). See text accompanying notes
36-41 supra.
94. 387U.S. 1 (1966).
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tional safeguards." Stinnet and Wh,;ite, it stated, had assumed
that juvenile court proceedings were not criminal in nature and
had found in this the constitutional infirmity of the subsequent
transfer.9 5 The court evidently thought that if the requirements of Gault, so construed, were met, the subsequent transfer
to a penal institution was permissible. Gault, however, explicitly disclaimed that it was insisting that all the constitutional
requirements of a criminal trial must be met in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.96
The court then considered whether this "great weight" of
authority was still valid in the light of four recent United States
97
Supreme Court cases.
Petitioner urges that these decisions make it clear that a statute
which provides for the transfer of arn inmate of a juvenile institution to a "functionally different" institution without a judicial finding of fact to support the transfer and without tradi95. But see the discussion of these cases at text accompanying notes
30-35, 48-50 supra.
96. Referring to Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) the Court
in Gault stated:
We announced with respect to such waiver proceedings
[for criminal prosecution] that while "We do not mean ...
to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all
the requirements of a criminal trial or even the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure
up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." We
reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile court
adjudication for delinquency.
387 U.S. at 30.
The premise of the present paper is that a juvenile proceeding does
not conform to all of the constitutional requirements of a criminal trial
and that Gault does not so require. This certainly represents present
practice under existing juvenile court codes. See, e.g., the provisions of
UNIFoRm JuvWNiE CoUnR ACT (1968). See also Shone v. State, 237 A.2d
412 (Me. 1968) stating, after discussing Gault, "Such prooceedings, we

hold remain civil in character, and the constitutional requirement of a
jury trial ... does not apply to them." Id. at 417. Note also the dissent

of Justice Harlan:
The court begins with the premise, to which it gives force at
several points, that juvenile courts need not satisfy "all of the
requirements of a criminal trial."
Id. at 74.
Justice Black, concurring with the majority, would go farther:
Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State,
charged, and convicted for violating a state criminal law, and
then ordered by the state to be confined for six years, I think
the Constitution requires that he be tried in accordance with
the guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 61.
97. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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tional constitutional safeguards deprives the inmate of due process and equal protection of the laws. 98

Again the issue was thus focused upon the procedural aspect of
the transfer. The equal protection of the laws argument of
counsel was, so the court stated, that the transfer is "without a
judicial proceeding" which other youths get when committed to
the state reformatory by a juvenile court. 9
With the issues thus posed, the court found little difficulty
in distinguishing Mempa v. Rhay'00 and Specht v. Patterson:10 1
The difference between the present case and Specht is that
the sentence under the sexual offender statute was a considerable enhancement of the maximum sentence for the crime of
which Specht had in fact been convicted while in the present
case the original commitment is not being extended in any way.
In Mempa, the Court found that due process requires that counsel be present at the time of sentencing where sentence has
been deferred subject to probation. However, there the alternatives were probationary freedom or confinement, and the sentencing court had to determine whether probation should be
revoked and a prison sentence imposed. Here, petitioner is already confined pursuant to a valid commitment, and the administrative determination only
affects the locus in which his con02
finement is to take place.1
Gault was distinquished with equal ease, for "petitioner is not
attacking the constitutional sufficiency of his original juvenile
proceedings" to which Gault is confined, "nor does he maintain
that a juvenile cannot be constitutionally committed to the Cor03
rection Center in the first place."'
The court closed its opinion with the observation that both
institutions were aimed at rehabilitation and continued:
To be sure, the methods employed at the Training Center ...
are milder and more suited to young and impressionable boys
....
Undoubtedly it is not desirable for a young boy to be
kept in company with experienced criminals in a prison environment. However it is equally undesirable to have a disruptive and incorrigible youth hampering the program at a juvenile
institution and exercising his unwholesome influence over the
98. 286 F. Supp. at 514.
99. 15 ME. REv. STAT. ANx. § 2611 (1964) authorized such a commitment. Similarly, the argument that due process was denied is addressed by the petitioner to the transfer procedure "in that a 'critical
finding' of a 'new fact' which affected the type of petitioner's sentence
was made administratively without the safeguards of criminal judicial
procedures." The court distinguished Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107
(1966) on the ground that the transfer in the present case involved no
extension of the term of possible confinement as it did in Baxstrom.
The Baxstrom case is discussed at text accompanying note 150 infra.
100. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
101. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
102. 286 F. Supp. at 514.

103. Id. at 515.
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other boys there. In administering custodial and rehabilitative
institutions, the state must have some latitude to determine
what course of treatment is most appropriate for the individual
inmate and to preserve discipline and protect the welfare of
other inmates within its various institutions.104

How this bore on the constitutional validity of the transfer was
not stated and again the key issue of whether a juvenile may be
confined in a penal institution as the result of a juvenile court
proceeding not conforming to the constitutional requirements
of a criminal trial was never considered.
Four main points may be noted in the arguments supporting
the transfers and commitments under consideration. It is said
first that the state has been given parental authority, custody
and control over the child through i;he juvenile court commitment. The state is merely a substitute for the child's parents
and is acting in their stead. However, this advances the constitutional justification very little. Obviously, there are constitutional limits imposed on the state which do not apply to a parent.
These can hardly be avoided by calling the state a parent. The
question still remains-when can a state confine a child in a
penal institution? The thought that a child has no rights beyond
what the state may choose to give him was laid to rest by
06
Gault'0 5 and Kent.
Second, it is said that in a juvenile court proceeding the child
has not been convicted of a crime, has no criminal record and is
in custody for his own welfare and the safety and welfare of
others. It is a peculiar inversion of logic to conclude that he may
therefore be confined in a penal institution rather than that he
may not be.
Third, it is argued that since the child's presence at a juvenile
institution is harmful to the institution, and the other children in
it, it is essential that his removal be permitted. That the necessity exists cannot be doubted. The argument is not, however, a
constitutional justification. It only warrants confinement in a
more secure juvenile treatment institution. Yet none of the
104. Id.
105. 387 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1967), stating:

So wide a gulf between the State's treatment of the adult
and of the child requires a bridge sturdier than mere verbiage,
and reasons more persuasive than cliche can provide. , ,.

In Kent v. United States supra, we stated that the Juvenile
Court Judge's exercise of the power of the state as parenspatriae
was not unlimited. We said that "the admonition to function
as a "parental" relationship is not an invitation to procedural
arbitrariness.
106. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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courts sustaining these transfers and conmitments address
themselves to this alternative.
Finally, the point is made that the penal institution provides
a form of treatment or rehabilitation and thus fulfills the objectives of the juvenile court commitment. The term "reformatory" invites this conclusion. It may be based also on statutory
provisions stating the purposes of the reformatory, 10 7 btit the
analysis seldom extends beyond this. There is no factual examination into the character of the program pursued in the instittion or of the facilities provided, or into the kind of program that

is needed to rehabilitate a child.
Nevertheless, the reason last assigned, though inadequately
developed, goes to the heart of any constitutional justification
that may exist and warrants further consideration. If in fact
the reformatory or other penal institution provides a program
which rehabilitates the child, does this not meet any constitutional objection? May not a penal institution for adult criminals
be used also for juvenile delinquents when the end result is the
attainment of the objectives of the juvenile court system?
The resolution of these questions is suggested in principles
developed by the United States Supreme Court in, analogous.

fields. While none of its decisions are directly in point, its tre atment and disposition of related issues indicate the direction it
will take on juvenile transfers and commitments. The indication
is that it will insist upon maintaining a distinct line between in
stitutions in which adult criminals are confined and those directed to the treatment of juvenile delinquents, and that juvenile
delinquents may not be committed or transferred to an institution for adult criminals even though the objective and effect
are, in a sense, rehabilitative.

D. UNITED STATES SUPREIE COURT CASES
There was a brief reference to juvenile penal commitments
in Gault. 08 In justifying the application of the privilege
against self-incrimination to juvenile court proceedings, the ourt
observed: "Indeed, in over half of the States, there is not even
assurance that the juvenile will be kept in separate institutions,
107. For a discussion of the failure of the reformatory ideal -in the
reformatories of the country, see H. BANES & N. TWEETERS, NEW
HomZoNs 3N CRnMvNOLOGY 428-33 (3d ed. 1959). In recent years, both
prisons and reformatories have proclaimed that rehabilitation of their
inmates is one of their primary objectives. Id. at 441. See also -note

59 supra.
108.

387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
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apart from adult 'criminals.' In those States juveniles may be
placed in or transferred to adult penal institutions." 109 The observation was made to emphasize the court's need to apply the
privilege against self-incrimination to juvenile court proceedings.
It was not intended as an endorsement of the practice. 10 ° Rather,
the implication is clear that the Court will look beyond the labels
placed by a state on any given program. To call a program reformatory when in fact it is punitive will not save it from constitutional attack."'
In examining the substance of the assertion that the commitments or transfers under consideration are but reformatory in
nature, two lines of Supreme Court decisions become relevant.
The first relates to the civil commitment of persons suffering
some disability for purposes of treatment. In Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court," 2 the Court had before it an involuntary civil commitment of a so-called "sex psychopath" or "psychopathic personality." The commitment was attacked on the
109.

U.S.

The Court cites W. SHERIAN & A.

FREER, CHILDREN'S

BUREAU,

HEW, DELINQUENT CHILDRE1 IN PENAL INSTITUTrONS, Pub.
No. 415-1964, at 1.
110. The authors of the article cited in note 109 supra, Sheridan &
Freer, consider the practice unconstitutional.
Elsewhere in a footnote to its opinion the Court cited among other
cases Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960) cited in note 51
supra, and White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954) discussed at
text accompanying note 31 supra, as indicating that "appropriate treatment is essential to the validity of juvenile custody." 387 U.S. 1, 23 n.30
(1967). These references negate any inference that might be drawn that
the Court looked kindly upon the practice under consideration.
State v. Fisher, 17 Ohio App. 2d 183, 245 N.E.2d 358 (1969)
interpreted Gault as prohibiting confinement of a juvenile delinquent in
a penal institution, and hence disregarded the earlier Ohio Supreme
Court decisions to the contrary.
111. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958):
But the Government contends that this statute does not impose
a penalty and that constitutional limitations on the power of
Congress to punish are therefore inapplicable. We are told this
is so because a committee of Cabinet members, in recommending this legislation to the Congress, said it "technically is not a
penal
law." and
Howof simple
would beif the
tasksproblems
of constitutional
adjudication
law generally
specific
could be
DEP'T OF

labels
pasted on them ...
But
solved
inspection
statute by
providing
that,of"a the
person
lose to
his this
liberty
by comA
theshall
answer
inquiry.
surely form cannot provide
nitting nonetheless
bank robbery,
though Nor
in form
a regulation
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would
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be
alteredis by
labeling connection
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there
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banks
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Id,atsubstance.
64. See also note 105 supra.
112. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
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grounds that the appellant had been denied due process of law
and that the statute under which the commitment was authorized was unconstitutionally vague, but was upheld on both
counts. On the issue of due process, the Court found that adequate notice, opportunity to be heard, and the right to be represented by counsel had been given. The Court did not address
itself to the question of whether the principles of due process governing criminal proceedings were applicable. Nevertheless, the
case warrants the conclusion that given compliance with the due
process requirements of a civil proceeding, involuntary confinement of the mentally ill by a noncriminal proceeding is constitutionally permissible." 3
Some years later, California undertook to impose criminal
penalties not only on the criminal acts of possessing, using, or
selling narcotic drugs, but also on those "addicted to the use of
narcotics.""14 In Robinson v. California,"5 the conviction of the

defendant as one so addicted was held unconstitutional. The
Court held that to punish a "status" which amounts to an illness
and to imprison a person
thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched
any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.116
What is significant for present purposes is the Court's observation

that
in the interest of discouraging the violation of such laws [dealing with narcotics], or in the interest of the general health or
welfare of its inhabitants, a State might establish a 11program of
compulsory treatment for those addicted to narcotics.
In a footnote the Court added,
California appears to have established just such a program in
§§ 5350-5361 of its Welfare and Institutions Code. The record
contains no explanation of why the civil procedures authorized
by this legislation were not utilized in the present case." 8

The Court continued:
Such a program of treatment might require periods of involuntary confinement. And penal sanctions might be imposed for

113. See also Lynch v. Overholzer, 369 U.S. 705 (1962) (incidental
discussion of civil proceedings to commit persons suffering from mental
illness).
114. CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 111721 (West 1955).

115.
116.
117.
118.

370 U.S. 660 (1961).
Id. at 667.
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 665 n.7.
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failure to comply with established compulsory treatment procedures." 9
By this dictum, the Court plainly recognized the validity of, and
in-fact encouraged the use of, involuntary civil commitments for
purposes of treatment.
1 20
The latest case in this category, PoweZl v. State of Texas,'
involved the chronic alcoholic. The defendant had been convicted of public drunkenness and fined $50.00.121 He appealed
on the ground that such was cruel and unusual punishment. The
conviction was sustained, but by a sharply divided court. Justice
Marshall, with whom Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black
and Harlan concurred, pointed to the imprecision of the concept
of chronic alcoholism, to the lack of consensus as to its causes,
and to the proper modes of, and facilities for, treatment. Under
these conditions he thought there were serious dangers both for
the public and for the alcoholic if resort to the criminal process
was forbidden. Robinson was distinguished since Powell
was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being
- in public while drunk on a particular occasion.
The State of
Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere status, as California
122
did in Robinson ....
Justice Marshall was unwilling to depart from "[t]raditional
common-law concepts of personal accountability" and by extending Robinson become involved in "the scope and content of
*hat could only be a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility.' 23 Current medical knowledge and the record in the case
before the-Court did not permit him to conclude
that chronic alcoholics in general, and Leroy Powell in particular, suffer from such an irresistible compulsion to drink and
to get drunk in public that they are utterly unable to control
their performance of either or both of' these acts and thus cannot be deterred at all from public intoxication.124
Justice Black, joined by Justice Harlan, concurred and added
some-additional considerations. He thought the claim that jail119. Justice Douglas concurring at 676, stated:
The addict is a sick person. He may, of course, be confined
for treatment or for the protection of society. [citing Lynch v.
Overholzer, 369 U.S. 705 (1962)] Cruel and unusual punishment results not from confinement, but from convicting the
addict of a crime.
120. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
1 . TEX. PEN. CoDE art. 477 (1948): "[W]hoever shall get drunk or
be found in a state of intoxication in any public place ... shall be
fined not exceeding one hundred dollars."
122. 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968).

123. Id. at 534-35.

124. Id. at 535. The trial court's findings to the contrary were disregarded as going beyond the proper function of findings.
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ing of chronic alcoholics has therapeutic value was not insubstantial and that, apart from this, jailing served other objectives of
the criminal law such as "isolation of the dangerous" and deterrence both of other potential alcoholics and of the chronic alcoholic himself. Powell's appearance in public was an act for
which he can be punished
without regard to whether his action was "compelled" by some
elusive "irresponsible" aspect of his personality .... [P]unishment of such a defendant can clearly
be justified in terms of
126
deterrence, isolation, and treatment.
'Mr. Justice White, concurring in the result, had a different
approach. He viewed Robinson as requiring the conclusion that
the chronic alcoholic with an irresistible urge to consume alcohol
should not be punishable for drinking or for being drunk.
Powell's conviction was for the different crime of being
drunk in a public place....
[There waa nothing to show that he had a] compulsion
not only to drink12to
6 excess but also to frequent public places
when intoxicated.

Powell was not therefore "shielded from conviction when he has
knowingly failed to take feasible precautions against committing
a criminal act, here the act of going to or remaining in a public
27

place."1

Justice Fortas dissented with Justices Douglas, Brennan and
Stewart concurring. For him, chronic alcoholism is medically
recognized as a disease attributable to a variety of causes and
subject to a variety of methods of treatment. The fact that existing knowledge on the subject is incomplete did not for him alter

the fact that
alcoholism is caused and maintained by something other than the
moral fault of the alcoholic, something that, to a greater or lesser
extent depending upon the physiological and psychological
make-up and history of the individual, cannot be controlled by
him.E128] ... [J] ailing of chronic alcoholics is punishment.
It is not defended as therapeutic, nor is there any basis for claiming that it is therapeutic (or indeed a deterrent).129

Justice Fortas would therefore apply Robinson which he construed as standing for the principle that "[c]riminal penalties
may not be inflicted upon30 a person for being in a condition
he is powerless to change."'
1125. Id. at 540.
126. Id. at 549.
127. Id. at 550.
128. Id. at 561.
129. Id. at 564.
130. Id. at 567. Justice Fortas stated also that:
[T]he findings of the trial court call into play the principle
tiat a person may not be punished if the condition essential
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The relevance of this decision to the topic under present discussion is tangential but nevertheless significant. Its significance lies in the implied assumption that an involuntary civil
commitment for treatment of chronic alcoholics is valid. The
five justices who were prepared to forbid the use of criminal
sanctions, Justice White on a more limited scale, could scarcely
have assumed otherwise and left the states to rely solely on the
relatively inadequate means of voluntary treatment. Justice
Fortas was careful to point out that "[t] his case does not raise
any questions ... as to the State's power to commit chronic alco-

holics for treatment."' 31 Justice Marshall also clearly assumed
132
that the alternative to punishment was civil commitment.
to constitute the defined crime is occasioned by a compulsion
symptomatic of the disease.
Id. at 569.
He would differentiate crimes committed while intoxicated such as
driving while intoxicated, assault, theft and robbery since these are

"not part of the syndrome of the disease."

Id. at 559 n.2.
131. Id. at 559.
132. Id. at 528-29.
Facilities for the attempted treatment of indigent alcoholics
are woefully lacking throughout the country. It would be tragic
to return large numbers of helpless, sometimes dangerous and
frequently unsanitary inebriates to the streets of our cities
without even the opportunity to sober up adequately which a
brief jail term provides. Presumably no state or city will
tolerate such a state of affairs. Yet the medical profession
cannot, and does not, tell us with any assurance that, even if
the buildings, equipment and trained personnel were available,
it could provide anything more than slightly higher-class jails
for our indigent habitual inebriates. Thus we run the grave
risk that nothing will be accomplished beyond the hanging of
a new sign-reading "hospital"-over one wing of the jailhouse.
One virtue of the criminal process is, at least, that the
duration of penal incarceration typically has some outside

statutory limit; this is universally true in the case of petty

offenses, such as public drunkenness, where jail terms are quite
short on the whole. "Therapeutic civil commitment" lacks this
feature; one is typically committed until one is "cured." Thus
to do otherwise than affirm might subject indigent alcoholics
to the risk that they may be locked up for an indefinite period
of time under the same conditions as before, with no more hope
than before of receiving effective treatment and no prospect of

periodic "freedom."
Id. at 531.
Justice Marshall's description raises the question whether civil confinement without, or with inadequate, treatment would not in itself be
illegal. See Nason v. Superintendent, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908
(1968); Director v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1965); Livermore,

Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justification for Civil Commitment, 117
U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968); Note, Civil Restraints, Mental Illness, and
the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967); Note, The Nascent
Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967).

Of course, Justice Marshall does not suggest, in holding a chronic
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Pearson, Robinson and Powell thus provide strong support
for the broad principle that a person suffering from some disability which seriously diminishes or robs him of his judgment
or control of his conduct may properly be subjected by civil proceedings to involuntary forms of treatment designed to remove
the disability and to restore or improve his judgment and control. Juveniles fall squarely within this category. In virtually
every area of the law, the immaturity of a person under 18 years
of age, the usual limit of juvenile court jurisdiction, or even 21
years of age, is recognized. He may not vote, or hold public office, he is not bound by his contracts for other than necessaries,
and he may not convey property or appear in an action except
through a guardian. He is protected from intoxicants, obscenity
and vice. Until the advent of the juvenile court, the principal
area of the law in which he has been held to the same degree of
accountability as an adult was that of the criminal law. The
laws establishing the juvenile courts were designed to remove
that anomaly, and substitute a civil procedure directed toward
rehabilitation of the child. 133 The constitutional validity of that
change seems evident from the foregoing cases. Gault is not to
the contrary. It merely insists that the civil proceedings for the
determination of delinquency conform to certain elementary
principles of due process.134
Quite different principles come into operation when the state
seeks to deal with an adult individual possessed of his normal
faculties. A line of Supreme Court decisions indicates that such
a person cannot be confined for purposes of treatment except
through the usual criminal proceedings with their attendant
constitutional requirements. Again, however, one mlust rely on
the language of the Court rather than on specific decisions to
that effect. In Williams v. New York, 13 5 for example, Justice
Black stated:
[T]he prevalent modern philosophy of penology [is] that the
punishment should fit the offender and not the crime.....
"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the crimalcoholic may be punished for his criminal acts, that he may not be

subjected to compulsory treatment for his condition. As to whether he

may be both punished and treated, see note 143 infra.
133. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
134. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
135. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). Here the Court upheld a trial court's
imposition of sentence of death over the objection that information contained in a presentence report had been used in arriving at the sentence
without the defendant confronting or cross-examining the witnesses sup-

plying the information.
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inal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."136
In another context,13 7 Justice Brennan, concurring in Trop v.
Dulles,3 8 stated:
In recent years we have seen such devices as indeterminate
sentences and parole added to the traditional term of imprisonment. Such penal methods seek to achieve the end, at once
more humane and effective, that society should make every effort to rehabilitate the offender and restore him as a useful
member of that society as society's own best protection. Of
course, rehabilitation is but one of the several purposes of the
penal law. 3 9
Indeed, so great has been the emphasis on rehabilitation as an
objective of the criminal law that Justice Marshall felt it necessary to say in Powell, "[t] his Court has never held that anything
in the Constitution requires that penal sanctions be designed
solely to achieve therapeutic or rehabilitative effects ....
These statements of principle by the Court warrant the conclusion that whenever a state attempts to impose involuntary
confinement of a normal adult person without his consent, even
though its purpose is to alter his behavior through treatment and
rehabilitation, the constitutional principles governing the imposition of criminal sanctions will be applied, including, of course,
the requirements of due process. This is also a necessary conclusion if the constitutional principles which have been so carefully and painstakingly evolved for the protection of the accused
in criminal cases are not to be eroded through the device of civil
commitment. Any other position would afford an easy route for
bypassing these protections, for all penal institutions now assert
that their primary objective is the rehabilitation of their inmates,
and it is clearly the objective of probation and parole.
It has been noted that Robinson and, with qualifications, the
majority in Powell take the view that a person under a disability
136. Id. at 248.
137. The topic was deprivation of citizenship for deserting the army.
138. 356 U.S. 86, 111 (1958). The Court held that deprivation of citizenship imposed a penalty and was unconstitutional as a bill of attainder.
139. Id. at 111. See also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965),
holding invalid as a bill of attainder a statute prohibiting a communist
party member from holding a labor union office and stating:
It would be archaic to limit the definition of "punishment" to
"retribution." Punishment serves several purposes; retributive,
rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive. One of the reasons
society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them
from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment.
Id. at 458.
140. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 530 (1968).
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such as narcotic addiction or chronic alcoholism cannot be subjected to criminal sanctions on the ground that he is in that
status or condition. It would appear to be a necessary consequence that he cannot, by civil commitment for treatment which
the court approves, be confined in a penal institution even
for purposes of treatment. The treatment program of a penal
institution is identified with an objective different from that
intended by a civil commitment. It centers on rehabilitation
as a reorientation of the convicted inmate who is there because he is deemed to be in possession of his normal mental faculties and is held morally and criminally responsible for the conduct which brought him there and which was the product of his
free choice. It is in this sense that rehabilitation of the inmate
is regarded as a criminal sanction requiring a constitutionally
valid conviction. The treatment program in an institution for
those who are the subject of a civil commitment has a different
focus. It is directed at a condition, disability or "status" of the
person who is the object of the program and assumes an absence, or at least a more limited degree, of free choice and hence
of moral and criminal responsibility. A treatment program with
this objective does not involve the application of criminal sanctions.
It is essential that these two aspects of treatment or rehabilitation remain distinctly identified as serving their separate roles.
If the constitutional rights surrounding the application of criminal sanctions are not to be undermined, treatment used as a
criminal sanction cannot be substituted for treatment directed
at a disability, unless there has been a valid criminal conviction.
The prohibition of Robinson and Powell against applying criminal sanctions to persons under disability requires, therefore,
that institutional treatment under a civil commitment be restricted to a nonpenal institution. Otherwise, what was prohibited by way of criminal proceedings could be accomplished
by resort to civil commitment.
No different conclusion is warranted when the person under
disability commits some criminal act, which under the differing
views expressed in Powell can be punished, and the state resorts
to civil commitment instead. The criminal act can justify commitment to a penal institution only if there has been a criminal trial and conviction which meets constitutional standards.
That the state in this situation may proceed by either civil commitment or criminal prosecution reflects the fact that courts
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have been disinclined to prescribe, in the words of Justice Marshall, "a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility."
Two state decisions support these conclusions. In re Maddox' 41 is particularly apt. A state statute provided for the com-

mitment of the criminal sexual psychopath. 142 The proceedings
were civil in character but were initiated in the course of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with a criminal offense. 143 Maddox, an adult, had originally been so committed
to a state hospital. Thereafter he was transferred by administrative action to a state prison on the recommendation of a state
psychiatrist who believed it to be medically indicated as a desirable and effective form of treatment. This procedure was declared unconstitutional in a vigorous opinion by Judge Edwards:
We are confronted here by a record that plainly shows that

life sentence in State prison, based solely on medical diagnosis,

can result from the administrative interpretations placed upon
the act. And this, without the person concerned ever having
been found guilty of any crime.
We reject any such interpretation of the statute...
This Court holds that incarceration in the penitentiary designed and used for the confinement of convicted criminals is
141. 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
142. MIcH. ComP. LAWS §§ 780.501-780.509 (1948). These sections
were repealed by Mich. P.A. 1968, No. 143, § 2.
143. Mcn. ComP. LAWS § 780.503 (1948). Section 780.508 provided
that on a finding that the defendant was a criminal sexual psychopath he
could not thereafter be tried or sentenced on the criminal charge. See
People v. Griffes, 13 Mich. App. 299, 164 N.W.2d 426, 430 (1968) stating:
[T]he question of whether sick people are to be treated for
their illness or punished for it, is a question which touches the
very heart of judicial consciousness of a civilized system of
jurisprudence. If perchance, the parties or counsel fail to raise
the matter our courts cannot close their eyes to so important
a matter. Under facts such as indicated in the present case,
the trial judge should have initiated criminal sexual psychopath
proceedings on his own motion once the defendant was convicted of the offense charged. It is essential to the dignity of
the jurisprudence of this State that we do not punish mental
disorder.
The opinions in Powell do not discuss the question whether commitment for treatment bars an otherwise permissible criminal conviction
or whether a conviction and sentence would bar a civil commitment
stemming from the same criminal act. See People v. Reyloso, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 468, 470, 412 P.2d 812, 814 (1966) (a case of drug addiction)
stating:
A defendant in a criminal case has not suffered double jeopardy
nor double punishment who has first been committed under
section 6451, Penal Code, to the California Rehabilitation Center
and later sentenced to prison in the criminal proceedings that
had been suspended.
The soundness of this position will not here be examined. If the
criminal act for which he is punished is not a basis for the civil commitment the problem of double jeopardy probably does not arise. See
Commonwealth v. Dagle, 345 Mass. 539, 188 X.E.2d 450 (1963).
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not a prescription available upon medical diagnosis and order
to an administrative branch of the government. Such confinement can only be ordered by a duly constituted court after trial
conducted in accordance with the guarantees pertaining to individual liberty contained in the Constitution of this State and
this nation. 144

Commonwealth v. Page145 reached a similar result although
in less positive terms. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts had
established a treatment center for sex offenders at a state
prison.1 46 By a civil proceeding prescribed by statute, the defendant, then serving a sentence for a criminal offense and about
to be discharged, was committed to this center. The appellate
court concluded that the evidence did not show that a true treatment center had been established but that on the contrary, persons committed under the act were housed with the general
prison population, no separate treatment staff was provided, and
the only treatment available was that offered to the prison population generally. The Court held that under these circumstances, the commitment was invalid:
[T]o be sustained as a nonpenal statute, in its application
to the defendant, it is necessary that the remedial aspects of
confinement thereunder have foundation in fact. It is not sufficient that the Legislature announce a remedial purpose if the
consequences to the individual are penal. While we are not
now called upon to state the standards which such a center must
observe to fulfill its remedial purpose, we hold that a confinement in a prison which is undifferentiated from the incarceration of convicted criminals is not remedial so as to escape constitutional requirements of due process.147

These cases represent but the concrete application of the
principles which find support in the Supreme Court decisions.
That these principles apply also to the commitment or transfer of
juvenile delinquents to a penal institution seems evident. Like
the sexual psychopath who is the subject of a civil commitment,
the juvenile delinquent has not been convicted of a criminal offense. His commitment is through a juvenile court procedure,
noncriminal in character, which does not contemplate all of the
constitutional protections of a criminal trial, and is for the pur144. 351 Mich. 358, 370, 88 N.W.2d 470, 477 (1958). The court cited
White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954), discussed at text accompanying note 36 supra.
145. 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959).
146. MAss. GEN.LAws ch. 123A (1958).
147. 339 Mass. 313, 317, 159 N.E.2d 85 (1959). Dodd v. Hughes, 81
Nev. 43, 398 P.2d 540 (1965) applied NEv. REv. STAT. § 433.310, authorizing confinement of a dangerous but mentally ill person in the State
Prison, without considering its constitutional validity. This section was
repealed by Nzv. STAT. ch. 541, § 59 (1967).
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poses of treatment and rehabilitation, the need for which stems
from his status of immaturity. His confinement in a penal institution under these circumstances is equally a denial of due
process.
IV. JUVENILE PENAL COMM1ITMENT-A DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The discussion thus far has centered on whether due process
is denied either by a transfer of a juvenile delinquent from a
juvenile institution to a penal one or by a direct juvenile court
commitment to a penal institution. Another obstacle to these
transfers or commitments lies in the constitutional prohibition
against the denial of the equal protection of the laws.148 This
question has received little consideration by courts passing upon
the validity of these practices. When their validity has been
upheld, it has been on the grounds, among others, that confinement in the penal institution was only an aspect of treatment
and did not constitute punishment for a crime. There was thus
little necessity to consider whether there had been a denial of
equal protection. 149 Cases denying the validity of the transfer or
commitment have been content to do so on due process grounds.
Baxstrom v. Herold, 15 however, raises the question to new
dimensions. The case involved the validity of New York's procedure for detaining in Dannemora H-ospital prisoners who were
mentally ill and whose term of imprisonment was expiring.25 '
148. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
149. There was a brief reference to the question in Shone v. State,
237 A.2d 412, 416 (Me. 1968). See note 83 supra.
In Shone v. Maine, 286 F. Supp. 511, 514 (S.D. Me. 1968) the
petitioner's complaint was said to lie in the denial of a judicial proceeding on transfer while it was granted in a commitment by a
juvenile court to the penal institution. The court merely distinguished
Baxstrom v. Herold, stating that in Baxstrom
the period of the commitment was an extension of the term of
the original criminal sentence imposed. In the present case,
the transfer does not prolong the period of confinement; it
merely changes the environment in which the original judicially
imposed commitment is to be served.
As the discussion in the text indicates, the impact of Baxstrom goes
beyond this narrow interpretation.
150. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
151. Dannemora Hospital is:
used for the purpose of confining and caring for such male
prisoners as are declared mentally ill while confined in a state
prison, reformatory, penitentiary or institution; for male defective delinquents, who have been sentenced or committed
thereto for a felony and others provided for under section three
hundred eighty three. The department of correction shall have
jurisdiction and control of such hospital
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After initiation of the proceeding by the hospital superintendent,
physicians examined the inmate and provided a certificate as to
his condition, and a court issued an order authorizing his continued detention.1 52 The procedure and standards applied were different from those applied to other persons who were not prisoners
but whose commitment to the hospital was sought. In the latter
situation the court was required to find the subject of the proceeding to be "dangerously mentally ill.' 153 Where the subject
was a prisoner, however, it was sufficient that the court find that
"such person may require care and treatment in an institution
for the mentally ill"-a much less rigid standard. Once that
finding was made, it became an administrative rather than a judicial question whether the prisoner should be confined in Dannemora or elsewhere.' 5" If the patient was not a prisoner in the
hospital, he was entitled to a jury trial de novo on the question
of his mental illness. No such right existed for prisoners.
A nonprisoner was thus given substantial protections, both
in standards to be met and in the procedures followed, that were
denied to a prisoner in the hospital whose term was expiring.
These differences were held by the court to be a denial of equal
protection of the laws and rendered the confinement of a prisoner invalid.
This statutory classification cannot be justified by the contention that Dannemora is substantially similar to other mental
hospitals in the State and that commitment to one hospital or
another is simply an administrative matter affecting no fundamental rights. The parties have described various characteristics of Dannemora to show its similarities and dissimilarities to
civil hospitals in New York. As striking as the dissimilarities
are, we need not make any factual determination as to the nature of Dannemora; the New York State Legislature has already
made that determination. By statute, the hospital is under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Correction and is used for the
purpose of confining and caring for insane prisoners and persons, like Baxstrom, committed at the expiration of a penal

N.Y. CoRRc. LAW § 375 (McKinney 1944). Section 383 covers "state
correctional institutions," "workhouse" and "city prison" in addition to
those mentioned in § 375.
152. N.Y. CoRREc. LAW § 384 (McKinney 1944). The section was
repealed in 1966 and the procedure altered to conform to the requirements of the Baxstrom case. See id. § 385.
153. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 85 (McKinney 1951). Before
application was made to the court, a certificate was required
that such patient . . .has committed or is liable to commit an

act or acts which if committed by a sane person would constitute homicide or felonious assault, or is so dangerously
mentally ill that his presence in such hospital is dangerous to
the safety of other patients therein.
154. N.Y. Co~aac. LAw § 384 (McKinney 1944).
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term.... Civil mental hospitals in New York, on the other
hand, are under the jurisdiction and control of the Department
of Mental Hygiene. Certain privileges of patients at Dannemora
are restricted by statute.... While we may assume that transfer among like mental hospitals is a purely administrative function, where, as here, the State has created functionally distinct
institutions, classification of patients for involuntary commitment to one of these institutions may not be wholly arbitrary. 155

The government contended that persons like Baxstrom had
demonstrated by their past criminal record that they were dangerously insane and therefore classifying them separately for
purpose of confinement was reasonable. To this the Court replied:
We find this contention untenable. Where the State has
provided for a judicial proceeding to determine the dangerous
propensities of all. others civilly comnmitted to an institution of
the Department of Correction, it may not deny this right to a
person in Baxstrom's position solely on the ground that he was
nearing the expiration of a prison term. It may or may not
be that Baxstrom is presently mentally ill and such a danger
to others that the strict security of a Department of Correction
hospital is warranted. All others receive a judicial hearing on
this issue. Equal protection demands that Baxstrom receive the
same. 156

The application of the principles developed by Baxstrom
would appear to render a transfer or direct commitment of a
juvenile delinquent to a penal institution equally invalid.157 He
has not been given the same protection of the laws as those in
the penal institution who arrive there for like conduct but following a criminal trial and conviction. The latter has had all
the constitutional protections attendant upon a criminal prosecution. The juvenile has not. Furthermore, the length of his possible confinement in the penal institution may in some cases be
longer than the statutory limits provided for confinement under
a criminal sentence for the crime involved. Juvenile court codes
155. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 113-14 (1966).
156. Id. at 114-15. For decisions applying the Baxstrom principles to
invalidate automatic confinement in a-mental hospital upon an acquittal
by reason of mental illness, see Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1968); Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also
People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87 (1966).
157. See State v. Fisher, 17 Ohio App. 2d 183, 245 N.E.2d 358 (1969).
(Baxstrom was not mentioned.) Earlier Ohio Supreme Court decisions
sustaining confinement of juveniles in penal institutions were disregarded in the light of Gault. See text accompanying note 70 supra. See
also dissent in In re Wilson, 251 A.2d 671 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1969) (majority decision without opinion); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642,
243 A.2d 400 (1968), holding a statute permitting greater maximum
prison terms for women than for men invalid as denying women equal
protection of the law.
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uniformly provide that on a commitment of a juvenile delinquent to a state department or state juvenile institution he may
be held for the duration of his minority. The delinquent act
which led to the juvenile's commitment may have been a felony
carrying a maximum sentence less than this period. It may have
been a misdemeanor or even noncriminal conduct such as truancy or incorrigibility for which an adult could not be tried or
confined at all. The unequal treatment is thus even more glaring than that which appeared in Baxstrom.
Some states have sought to reduce these anomalies and elements of unfairness by limiting the power to transfer or commit
a juvenile to a penal institution to instances in which the particular conduct leading to the adjudication of delinquency constituted a felony.r,8 However, such provisions meet the objection
of unconstitutional treatment only in the sense that others in
the penal institution are also there for having committed a
felony. Other aspects of the objection remain. The juvenile
still has not had a criminal trial and his confinement may be for
a longer period than that permitted for adults depending on his
age and the maximum sentence prescribed for the crime involved.
These provisions also defeat in substantial measure the very
reasons given for authorizing transfers from a juvenile to a penal
institution, namely, that the child is incorrigible, uncontrollable
and disruptive of the juvenile institution. These reasons apply
whether his commitment is based on the commission of a felony,
misdemeanor or noncriminal conduct. To limit transfers to
those children who have committed a felony makes the transfers
purely arbitrary and only a partial solution to the problem. It
increases rather than decreases the validity of the objection that
these transfers deny to the child the equal protections of the
laws. Some misbehaving children would be transferred for their
misconduct while others creating equal or greater problems for
the juvenile institution would not, based solely on the irrelevant
question of whether the conduct which brought them there constituted a felony.
V. THE VALIDITY OF A SEPARATE PROGRAM
WITHIN PENAL INSTITUTIONS
It has thus far been assumed that the juvenile delinquents
transferred or committed to a penal institution are integrated
158. E.g., N.Y. FAmmY CT. ACT § 758 (McKinney 1963); Onro R v.
CoDE AwN. § 2151.35 (E) (Page 1968), quoted in note 16 supra.
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into the general population of the institution and participate in
an undifferentiated program with prisoners confined under sentence. There remains the question whether a separate program
designed for the juvenile may be conducted within the walls of
the institution. So far as can be discovered, this has nowhere
been tried. Some possible support for such a program may be
found in state decisions dealing with separate programs for mentally ill persons or narcotics addicts which were located in penal
institutions.
In re De La 0159 dealt with this question as it affects narcotics addicts. Pursuant to statute,1 ° California had established
a Rehabilitation Center for addicts under the control and direction of the Director of Corrections and located at a state prison.
Those committed to the center were fingerprinted and had their
mail censored. Maximum and minimum periods of confinement
were specified by statute and parole was under the direction of
the agency empowered to grant paroles and fix sentences for
persons committed to a state prison. 61
Relying on Robinson' 62 the defendant, who had been committed to the Center, contended that he was "being incarcerated
and treated in the same manner as if he were a felon." To this
the court replied:
It appears, however, that the branch of the California Rehabilitation Center where petitioner is confined is physically and
administratively distinct from the other facilities at Chino and
consists of 16 buildings including dormitories, gymnasium, mess
hall, academic and vocational buildings, and others; that the
California Rehabilitation Center employs a full-time psychiatrist and professionally trained counselors and therapists; and
that petitioner is given daily group therapy and twice weekly
intensive therapy in small units of not more than 15 men,
all under the direction of trained counselors. In addition, the
California Rehabilitation Center provides a specially selected
vocational and academic program.163
The court concluded
that the demonstrably civil purpose, mechanism, and operation
of the program outweigh its external. "criminal" indicia, and
hence that petitioner's commitment and confinement thereunder
do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of [Robinson].164
159. 59 Cal. 2d 128, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793 (1963).
160. CAL. WELF. & INST'ls CoDE § 3050 (West 1966), formerly Cal.
Penal Code § 6450.
161. 59 Cal. 2d 128, 144, 378 P.2d 793, 803, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 499
(1963).
162. See discussion in text accompanying notes 115-19 supra.
163. 59 Cal. 2d 128, 148, 378 P.2d 793, 806, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 502
(1963).
164. Id. at 149, 378 P.2d at 807, 28 Cal. :Rptr. at 503.
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De La 0 was followed by In re Cruz.165 Cruz had been
transferred from the California Rehabilitation Center, where he
was confined under a commitment procedure as a narcotics addict, to a "branch" of the Center established at a prison. The
transfer was sustained in an opinion which appears to retreat
somewhat from the standard implicit in De La 0. The court
pointed out the necessity for a more secure institution for addicts such as Cruz and continued:
Equally unsupported by the facts is petitioner's further contention that the conditions of his confinement at California
Men's Colony-East constitute "cruel and unusual punishment"
within the meaning of Robinson.... It is true that the 46 addicts in that facility ... are not housed apart from the other
inmates, but the People explain that the decision not to segregate them was taken "[iJ n order to prevent internal security
and management problems and to expose them to the normal
activities of the Facility. . . ." More importantly, these addict
inmates are offered a program of treatment and rehabilitation
similar in all respects to that of the central facility at Corona:
i.e., qualified counseling on a weekly basis in groups of less
than ten men, plus individual counseling when indicated; academic and vocational training, plus regular work assignments;
recreational and religious facilities; and periodical progress
evaluation with a view to retransfer to the central facility at
Corona or direct release to out-patient status .... Nothing in
Robinson ... forbids such special civil confinement for the
treatment and rehabilitation of the individual addict and for
the protection of the society.166
The opinion appears to permit some mixing of addicts with the
other prison population, although the extent is not clear. But
the emphasis is on the separate treatment given addict inmates
identical with that of the central institution.
Commonwealth v. Page6 7 left open the question whether a
program for sexual psychopaths housed in a prison which was
not "undifferentiated from the incarceration of convicted criminals" could be sustained. The issue was met in Commonwealth
v. Hogan. 68 The center in which the defendant was confined
was now housed in a separate wing of a hospital for the criminally insane. The wing was isolated from the rest of the institution by locked double doors. The general medical staff of the
institution appears to have been used for the center. The center
contained no full-time staff, but part-time personnel were available to meet the treatment needs from day to day. The dining
165. 62 Cal. 2d 307, 398 P.2d 412, 42 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1965).
166. Id. at 316, 398 P.2d at 417, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
167. 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959). The case is discussed
at text accompanying note 145 supra.
168. 341 Mass. 372, 170 N.E.2d 327 (1960).
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and infirmary facilities of the general institution were used for
the center, but the policy was to keep the inmates of the center
separated from the general population of the hospital. These
arrangements were temporary pending more complete establishment of the center. With a cautionary comment,169 the court
held that under these circumstances the remedial character of
the center was sufficient to meet the requirements of Page.
The degree to which these decisions afford any reliable support for placing juvenile delinquents in a penal institution with
a separate program is open to doubt. Assuming the cases are
relevant, neither their specific holdings nor the opinions written
to support them evidence an awareness of the distinction, previously adverted to, between treatment as a criminal sanction
and nonpenal treatment for a disability, or of the fact that
presence in a penal institution alone invites identification of the
program for those under civil commitment as penal, both by the
public and the committed person himself.
The court in De La 0 noted that the Center being considered
was physically and administratively distinct from the other
prison facilities. This suggests that a separate superintendent
or warden with his own staff and records may be required.
These cases also seem to require a large degree of isolation of
the juveniles from the adult population although the degree of
separation required is not clear. May they share common cell
blocks, eat at the same tables, join in recreation activities, work
in the same shops, sit at the same movies, attend the same religious services, go to the same education classes and share the
same medical and hospital facilities, such as beds in the same
wards? Probably none of these is permissible. Could the institutional activities operate in shifts, one for juveniles, the other
for adults, the isolation being thus maintained? The answer is
more clearly no. To call each of the shifts by different namesone punishment of adults, the other rehabilitation of juveniles
-would be to resort to the kind of hypocrisy condemned by the
Supreme Court.
Finally, there is no indication that the Supreme Court would
be as permissive as the decisions might indicate. Imprisonment
is still the dominant sanction of the criminal law. The Court
169. We cannot assume that the necessary action to establish a
fully adequate treatment center, already begun, will not be
carried to completion. If it should later appear that it has not,
a different question will be presented.
Id. at 377, 170 N.E.2d at 330.
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might well take the position that any institution used by the
state for the imprisonment of convicted persons is ipso facto a
penal institution in which persons not found guilty of a crime by
constitutionally valid procedures cannot be confined regardless
of the special programs existing within it.

70

That position

would maintain clearly the distinct functions of treatment; as a
penal function, on the one hand, for those held responsible for
their criminal conduct and as a rehabilitative or corrective function, on the other hand, for those under some disabling status or
condition, in the present context, juvenile delinquents. It would
also remove from the trial and appellate courts questions about
the constitutionally required degree of separation that must be
maintained between programs directed at these different functions and operating within the same institution, questions to
which probably no clear cut, satisfactory or enduring answers
could be given.
VI. MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE
Minnesota has had some experience in the use of the State
Reformatory for purposes other than those for which it was originally intended. In 1945, legislation authorized the creation
of an Annex within the Reformatory for mentally defective persons who were committed or transferred there by civil proceedings. 171 Personal observation by this writer disclosed that, while
the Annex was in operation, the principal separation from the
other inmates of the institution consisted only in their location
in a separate room, called a dormitory 72 They were assigned
to work with convicted inmates and were subject to the general
and disciplinary rules of the institution, including confinement
in solitary isolation cells for misconduct. A Commission appointed in 1962 by former Governor Elmer Anderson reported
that, notwithstanding the program's apparent success, the confinement of these individuals in the Annex was unnecessary and
170. Compare the statement in Baxstrom, quoted in text accompanying note 155 supra.
171. [1945] Minn. Laws, ch. 565.
172. While a separate dormitory was set up for housing, no
funds were made available for separate staff or training facilities and it was decreed that the staff of the Reformatory and
its facilities were to be used in this program. The Superintendent of the State Reformatory also became the Superintendent
of the Annex for Defective Delinquents and the Reformatory
Director of Education was designated as Supervisor and Training Director for the Annex.
From a mimeographed statement supplied by the Reformatory to the
Commission appointed in 1962 by Governor Elmer Anderson.
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probably amounted to a denial of their constitutional rights.
Upon the Commission's recommendation, use of the Annex was
17 3
discontinued.
When the Youth Conservation program was first adopted,
the reception center for youth offenders' 74 was located at the Reformatory. Later, in 1957, a separate reception center was established at Lino Lakes, Minnesota, 175 in order to remove the identification of the youths at the center with the Reformatory itself
as a penal institution and to make possible a better diagnostic
program. It was intended by the Youth Conservation program
that those committed to the Reformatory under this Act would
receive special treatment and rehabilitation distinct from the
program for adults at the institution. 7 ( This has never materialized.
Thus, the experience at the Reformatory with collateral programs of this kind has not been a reassuring one. One explanation is that the structure itself is an antiquated one, ill-adapted
to serving any function other than the traditional regimented
prison routine. It does not permit the development of the kind
of facilities needed for an effective individualized rehabilitation
program, assuming that the independent problem of staff could
be resolved.

VII. CONCLUSION
Legislation authorizing the transfer or commitment of juvenile delinquents to reformatories and other penal institutions
and facilities has been motivated primarily by the desire to remove problem children from juvenile institutions with a minimum expenditure of money. Its purpose has not been to respond
to the challenge these children present by providing an effective
rehabilitation program. Most of the statutes were adopted at a
time when the constitutional rights of individuals were not as
well articulated as they are at the present time. If the analysis
made in this paper is correct this legislation will not withstand
173. [1963] Minn. Laws, ch. 214 repealed the law.
In 1962, repeal of the law was recommended by the Committee on
Youth Conservation and Adult Corrections of the Minnesota State Bar
Association, headed by a distinguished member of the bar, Mr. Frank
Claybourne.

19 BENCH & BAR oF MIfNN. 67 (June, 1962).

The recommen-

dation was approved by the Association. Id. at 28 (July, 1962).
174. These are youths under 21 years of age who have been convicted of a felony [see Mmw. STAT. §§ 242.13, 242.19(b) (1967)J and are
to be distinguished from juveniles found delinquent by a juvenile court.
See MINN. STAT. § 260.015(5) (1967).
175. MIbN. STAT. § 242.385 (1967).
176. See MftNN. STAT. §§ 242.18, 242.20 (1967).
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constitutional attack. Substantial expenditures made to implement it run the risk of such attack 177 and would serve a better
purpose if used to establish a separate facility especially designed to meet the problems of these juveniles and integrated
into the total state program for the rehabilitation of delinquent
children. 178 States in increasing numbers are providing these
separate facilities-a development that would be stimulated

greatly if more state courts, without waiting for the United
States Supreme Court to tell them so, frankly recognized that
the cheaper route of transfer or commitment to a penal institution is neither penologically sound nor constitutionally valid.
177. There also may be personal liability for false imprisonment on
the part of those responsible for the transfer to the penal institution and
for his confinement there. That the warden may be liable is suggested
in Peterson v. Lutz, 212 Minn. 307, 308, 3 N.W.2d 489 (1942): "A jailer
or prison superintendent can be held liable for false imprisonment in an
action by a prisoner detained beyond the expiration of his sentence."
Confinement under a void transfer should carry the same consequence as detention after expiration of a valid sentence. See also
Garvin v. Muir, 306 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957) (jailer held liable);
Nostasi v. State, 275 App. Div. 524, 90 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Ct. Cl. 1949)
(denial of claim against the state reversed); Schildhous v. City of New
York, 163 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Sp. Term 1957) (city held liable-what constitutes invalidity on its face discussed).
If the warden is liable for confining a juvenile received through
administrative transfer, it would seem logical to impose liability also
on the administrators who sent him there. No cases were found dealing
with this question.
In either case, the defense that the confinement was pursuant to an
order or sentence valid on its face and issued by a court having jurisdiction is inapplicable. See Peterson v. Lutz, supra; Nostasi v. State,
supra; Commings v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 932, 255 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Ct. Cl.
1964); Schildhous v. City of New York, supra; Jennings, Tort Liability
of Administrative Officers, 21 Mimx. L. REv. 263, 281 (1937). The
juvenile court commitment does not and cannot show on its face valid
authority for the transfer since the commitment evidences no criminal
conviction but rather the contrary. Moreover, if the commitment is
from a court not having criminal jurisdiction, for example, a probate
court, the second leg of the defense also would not be met.
178. This is recommended by the Committee on Youth Conservation
and Adult Corrections of the Minnesota State Bar Association:
[T]he only satisfactory solution lies in the establishment of a
new special security institution for the containment and treatment of this hard core delinquent group.
24 BENCH & BAR OF MINN.156 (May-June 1968).

Confinement in penal institutions is opposed by the UNITED STATES
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, STANDARDs FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS, at
35, 86 (1966); the NATIONAL CoUNcnm ON CRIME AND DELINQUENcY,
STANDARD FAMILY COURT ACT, § 24 (1959); and the NATIONAL CONFERENCE

OF COMIvnSSIONERS ON UNI1ORM STATE LAws, UN romR
ACT § 33 (a) (1968):

JuvENmE COURT

A child shall not be committed or transferred to a penal
institution or other facility used primarily for the execution of
sentences of persons convicted of a crime.

